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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH--"IT'S OK-SHE'S A PIXEL, NOT A PIXIE": THE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTS VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
I. INTRODUCTION
Graphic depictions of sexual behavior, often known interchangeably as
pornography or obscenity,' have troubled Anglo-American society for sev-
eral centuries.2 Seeking modes of protecting those perceived as vulnerable
to the supposedly nefarious effects of such depictions, society has increas-
ingly turned to the judiciary and the legislature to define and limit the pos-
session, creation, and distribution of such images. 3 Over the past twenty or
so years, chief amongst the societal concerns over graphic sexual depictions
has been child pornography, which, whether legally obscene or not, poses a
genuine threat to the welfare of its child victims. 4 Recent technological ad-
vances in the creation and manipulation of digital images have spurred con-
cern in some quarters over what observers commonly call "virtual child
porn": images that do not depict real children, but, through the use of youth-
ful-looking actors or computer technology, seem to portray children in
graphic sexual situations.5 The United States Congress, compelled by con-
cern over such images, enacted the Child Pornography Protection Act of
1996 (CPPA),6 prohibiting images that appeared to portray real children in
sexually explicit 'situations or conveyed the impression that real children
participated in the production of the images.7 The Supreme Court, however,
recently determined the CPPA to be overbroad because it banned images
1. GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 22-
23 (1988) (citing UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT 3
n.4 (1970)). A brief note on these terms is in order. While many casual observers use the
terms "pornography" and "obscenity" interchangeably, more precise examination of the topic
demands a distinction. The Meese Commission (named for then-United States Attorney
General Edwin Meese) report on the topic best explains this distinction: while obscenity
"refer[s] to material that has been or would likely be found to be obscene in the context of a
judicial proceeding employing applicable legal and constitutional standards," pornography is
"undoubtedly pejorative" and without sufficient legal meaning to merit extensive use in the
commission report. Id. at 23-24 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY FINAL REPORT 227-28, 230 (1986)).
2. See infra Part 111.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000).
7. Id.
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that were neither legally obscene nor child pornography in which real chil-
dren faced sexual abuse.8
This note explores the Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition decision,
finding the case's significance in reasserting the Court's stance that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit materials unless the materials are either obscene
or constitute actual child pornography in which children suffer harmful sex-
ual abuse, thereby protecting legitimate expression from heavy-handed cen-
sors.9 In reaching that significance, the note first examines the history of
attempts to curb obscenity through legal channels, moving from early Eng-
lish obscenity cases to twentieth-century American judicial attempts to de-
fine obscenity, and finally discussing prohibitions on child pornography that
create an exception to the law of obscenity.' 0 From this historical legal
background, the note moves into an examination of the Supreme Court's
analysis of the CPPA."1 This examination of the Court's reasoning provides
the basis for a discussion of the Ashcroft Court's reaffirmation of earlier
principles on obscenity and a brief excursion into the sorts of censorial
abuses that the Supreme Court sought to prevent with its Ashcroft holding.
12
In conclusion, the note suggests that proponents of measures like the CPPA
will likely pass new legislation that will attempt to effect the same restric-
tions by means of different wording. 3
II. FACTS
Following the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Ferber'4 that
sexually explicit materials involving the abuse of children did not merit
First Amendment protection,' 5 Congress passed anti-child pornography leg-
islation that sought to protect children from sexual exploitation in such por-
nographic materials. 16 The laws that followed Ferber explicitly required that
child pornography involve "minor[s] engage[d] in[] any sexually explicit
8. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239-40, 258 (2002). Justice Ken-
nedy announced the majority opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined. Id. at 238. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment of the Court. Id. Justice
O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia concurring in Part II of her dissenting opinion. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia concurred except for one paragraph. Id.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part V.
14. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
15. Id. at 764-65
16. See Brief for Respondents at 1-4, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (No. 00-795).
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conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such con-
duct."'17 In the mid-1990s, new technology 18 disturbed the United States
Congress into expanding the definition of child pornography punishable by
federal statute.' 9 The product of this new concern, the CPPA,20 "expanded
the law to combat the use of computer technology to produce pornography
containing images that look like children., 21 As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remarked, "[t]he regulation direction shifted
from defining child pornography in terms of the harm inflicted upon real
children to a determination that child pornography was evil in and of itself,
whether it involved real children or not.,
22
Specifically, the CPPA extended "the federal prohibition against child
pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but
were produced without using any real children., 23 The CPPA prohibited
"possessing or distributing [such] images, which may be created by using
adults who look like minors or by using computer imaging." 24 The differ-
ence between the CPPA and the child pornography statutes that preceded it
is that the CPPA "shifted the paradigm from the illegality of child pornog-
raphy that involved the use of real children in its creation to forbid a 'visual
depiction' that 'is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct."'
25
The Act faced challenges on many different fronts. 26 One such chal-
lenge was a pre-enforcement challenge filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California by a group consisting of sev-
eral different parties who challenged the constitutionality of some of the
CPPA's provisions. 27 The Free Speech Coalition ("Free Speech") requested
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2000).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Congressional Findings (5)). Congress found that "new photo-
graphic and computer imagining [sic] technologies make it possible to produce ... visual
depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtu-
ally indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of
actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct." Id.
19. See Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Ashcroft (No. 00-795).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000).
21. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999).
22. Id.
23. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002).
24. Id.
25. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1089 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(B) (West Supp. 1999)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the CPPA was not void for vagueness and gave adequate notice of the material it prohib-
ited), vacatedby 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 76-77 (1st Cir.
1999) (holding that the CPPA was not unconstitutionally vague because its language gave
adequate notice as to what the law prohibited).
27. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281 SC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212,
at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999),
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declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of certain provi-
sions of the CPPA.28 Both Free Speech and the government moved for
summary judgment in the district court. 29 The court granted the govern-
ment's motion and denied Free Speech's motion, finding that the CPPA
provision was not unconstitutionally vague because the statute gave suffi-
cient guidance to reasonably intelligent people as to what the law prohibited
and did not impose a prior restraint on speech.3 °
Following the district court's grant of summary judgment, Free Speech
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, argu-
ing that the district court erred in "its determination that the legislation
[was] content neutral" and that the CPPA was "not unconstitutionally
vague."'" Free Speech argued that the CPPA was unconstitutionally vague
because the act failed to define "appears to be" and "conveys the impres-
sion" so that people of ordinary intelligence could determine what the law
prohibited.32
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court decision,33 finding that the
CPPA was not content neutral because its provisions demanded a "blanket
suppression of an entire type of speech," making the Act one "founded upon
content-based classification of speech. 34 Congress's intent in passing the
Act to combat the secondary effects35 of speech that appeared to depict chil-
dren engaging in sexual activity did not sufficiently justify the CPPA's re-
strictions "because to hold otherwise enables the criminalization of foul
figments of creative technology that do not involve any human victim in
their creation or in their presentation."3 6 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held
overruled in part, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). The group con-
sisted of the following: The Free Speech Coalition, a trade association of companies that
produce and distribute graphic materials; Bold Type, Inc., the publisher of a book "dedicated
to the education and expression of the ideals and philosophy associated with nudism;" Jim
Gingerich, a New York painter whose works include large nude portraits; and Ron Raffaelli,
a professional photographer of nude and erotic scenes. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1086 (internal
citations omitted).
28. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1086.
29. Id.
30. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212, at **21, 23.
31. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1086-87.
32. Id. at 1087.
33. Id. at 1097.
34. Id. at 1090-91. The court further found that the CPPA was "not a time, place, or
manner regulation." Id. at 1091.
35. Id. Secondary effects of child pornography include the "exploitation and degrada-
tion of children." Id. at 1090. More specifically, the Ninth Circuit discussed the "victimiza-
tion of children that may arise from pedophiles' sexual responses to pornography apparently
depicting children engaging in explicit sexual activity." Id. at 1093.
36. Id. (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992)).
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that the CPPA established a content-specific ban on speech without a state
interest sufficient to meet constitutional standards.
37
The Ninth Circuit also found the two phrases in question-"appears to
be a minor" and "conveys the impression"-void as unconstitutionally
vague because the phrases were highly subjective, provided no explicit
definition of the phrases' meaning, and provided no means to instruct an
ordinarily intelligent person as to what conduct the statute prohibited.38 The
phrases were also constitutionally overbroad because they prohibited activi-
ties that the Constitution protected as well as activities that government may
legitimately prohibit. 39 Following the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district
court's decision, the Government moved the court for a rehearing and re-
hearing en banc, but the court denied the petitions.40 Following the denial of
a rehearing, the Government petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted a.4 Thus, the battle over virtual child pornography reached the
Supreme Court, which would decide the status of the CPPA in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition.42
III. BACKGROUND
While graphic depictions of sexuality-both written and visual-
apparently have a long history,43 such depictions did not become widely
available in England and its colonies until the early eighteenth century.44
The English elite had previously enjoyed erotic poetry and other bawdy
literature, but sexual writing did not cause concern because the few people
who could read were considered to be somewhat above any corrupting in-
fluence. a The rise of literacy in England46 and the resulting proliferation of
37. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1090-91, 1095.
38. Id. at 1095.
39. Id. at 1096.
40. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 220 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
41. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001).
42. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
43. See FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF
PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE 1 (2000). For example, the Venus of Willendorf, a small
limestone figurine found in the Danube River's mud in 1908 and carbon dated at over 20,000
years old, is "clearly designed to highlight and accentuate female sexual characteristics." Id.
44. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE 1N ENGLAND 1500-1800, at
537 (1977). Stone notes that "it was only in the eighteenth century that there first developed
the large-scale production of home-made English pornography, both in literature and in
pictures." Id.
45. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, OBSCENITY: AN ACCOUNT OF CENSORSHIP LAWS AND
THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES 16 (1979).
46. J. PAUL HUNTER, BEFORE NOVELS: THE CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLISH FICTION 66 (1990). Hunter notes that some evidence suggests that the
literacy rate amongst males increased as much as threefold between 1600 and 1800. Id.
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printed publications,47 however, led to a desire on the part of some officials
to regulate the books people read and the pictures people viewed, a censo-
rial enthusiasm that spread to the American colonies and their successor
states as well.48 After briefly tracing the development of English attempts to
regulate obscenity and pornography, this section examines the importation
and implementation of English standards to the United States and the subse-
quent constitutionalization of the obscenity issue in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury through which the United States Supreme Court defined what sorts of
sexual expression receive protection from state regulation.
A. The English Courts and Obscenity, 1650-1868
Early English law spent very little energy attempting to regulate the
content of literature and other forms of expression for obscenity. 49 The rise
of a broader reading public and the more frequent presentation of frank sex-
ual matter on page and stage, however, gave voice to cries for restrictions
on content in the name of public morality.5° With the 1641 abolition of the
infamous Star Chamber5' and the loss of the ecclesiastic courts' power over
the laity,52 the only English courts with the authority to enforce such regula-
tions were the common-law courts, which in the mid-seventeenth century
entered more forcefully into regulating publications.
5 3
47. See CATHERINE GALLAGHER, NOBODY'S STORY: THE VANISHING ACTS OF WOMEN
WRITERS IN THE MARKETPLACE 1670-1820, at 8-9 (1994) (discussing the transition from the
patronage system of authorship--wealthy patrons financing writers' endeavors-to a system
based more upon widespread sale of texts to consumers).
48. See infra notes 104-36 and accompanying text.
49. See P.R. MACMILLAN, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLIC MORALITY 1-2 (1983) (pointing out
that most early English attempts at censorship focused on heresy and sedition against the
crown).
50. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 2, 4-5 (1976).
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999). The Star Chamber, abolished be-
cause of abuses of its power, was a court that exercised broad civil and criminal jurisdiction
over defendants who enjoyed no right to a jury. Id.
52. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, SOME INTELLECTUAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION 56-57 (1980). The Church of England never regained all its power after the
restoration of the English monarchy in 1660. Id. Lacking the power to enforce its verdicts,
the Church faced derision from its subjects and lost authority and power to the common law
courts and Parliament. Id.
53. MACMILLAN, supra note 49, at 1-2.
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1. Attempts at the Regulation of Obscenity in the Restoration and
Early Eighteenth-Century Periods
The development of early English attempts to regulate obscenity traces
through three cases:54 The King v. Sedley,55 The Queen v. Read,56 and The
King v. Curl.57 These cases find their importance in the new assertion that
the English courts had the power to fill the role of moral censor and to pro-
scribe works for sexual content alone 5 8 The views of the courts shift some-
what over this early period; this subsection will trace those views as they
emerge in these three cases.
a. Sedley: The first English obscenity case
The first instance of English courts asserting the authority to regulate
public morals is the case of poet Charles Sedley. 59 Sedley's poetry did not
earn him the ire of the courts; rather, a drunken revel at a London tavern
ending in a shocking display of public nudity earned him the attention of the
authorities. 60 Emboldened by drink, Sedley and his fellows climbed to the
balcony of the Cock Tavern, bared their buttocks, and defecated in the
street.61 Further emboldened by this brazen display, Sedley stripped and
made indecorous comments to the gathered crowd, inciting a near riot in
54. For an argument that the eighteenth century took obscenity somewhat lightly and
that these three cases represent prosecutions based more on politics than pornography, see
Richard R. Reynolds, Our Misplaced Reliance on Early Obscenity Cases, A.B.A. J., FEB.
1975, at 200, 222. Reynolds claims that the refusal to censor the popular Fanny Hill, which
he finds to be "[t]he chief offender" amongst the period's pornographic literature, indicates
that eighteenth-century officials were not terribly keen on censoring such materials on their
face value as obscenity. Id. Reynolds's argument loses some force when considered in light
of such developments as the formation of societies for the censorship of immorality during
the period. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 4-5.
55. 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1663). This case is also reported at 83 Eng. Rep. 1146
(K.B. 1663).
56. 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1708). This case is also reported (at a different level of
specificity) by a different reporter at 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (K.B. 1708).
57. 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727).
58. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 4.
59. Sedley, 82 Eng. Rep. at 1036-37. Sedley, a court poet during the reign of King
Charles 11, was "a violent and dissolute man, given to indecent public pranks from the conse-
quences of which only his good friend the king could save him." See SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY PROSE AND POETRY 1035 (Alexander M. Witherspoon & Frank J. Warnke eds., 2d
ed. 1982).
60. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 21. For Sedley and some of his contemporaries, pub-
lic exhibitionism was apparently a normal part of a fun night on the town. Roger Thompson
reports that several other poets of the era also enjoyed the occasional nude public frolic. See
ROGER THOMPSON, UNFIT FOR MODEST EARS 187 (1979).
61. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 21.
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which some of Sedley's angry listeners rampaged through the streets and
broke windows.
62
The Court of the King's Bench tried Sedley, but Sedley demanded to
have the ecclesiastic courts hear his case. 63 The court rejected Sedley's de-
mands, announcing that inherent in the court's authority was the power to
regulate the morality of the king's subjects, regardless of whether there was
any precedent or even a specific law against the behavior in question.64 The
court levied a heavy fine against Sedley for his offense.65 While Sedley
deals with an overt act of disagreeable public behavior, "its significance lies
in the fact that this was the first time that offensiveness to decency, apart
from religious or political heresy, was an element of an offense against the
state."
66
b. Read: An attempt to use Sedley as precedent
The Queen v. Read67 is the first case in which a person stood trial in
England accused of obscene libel for the act of publishing sexually explicit
material. 68 The government indicted James Read for committing obscene
libel69 by publishing The Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead,70 a rather indeli-
cate tract suggesting that chastity was little more than one of the nastier
results of malnutrition. 71 Obscene libel, charged for the first time in this
case, would become the procedural cornerstone of English obscenity law for
quite a long time.72
Interestingly, given obscene libel's future as the basis for English ob-
scenity law, the Queen's Bench Court dismissed Read's indictment, draw-
ing a distinction between a "crime that shakes religion," such "as profane-
ness on the stage, &c. [that] is indictable," and "writing an obscene book, as
that intitled [sic], 'The Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead,"' which "is not





66. SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 4.
67. 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1708). This case is also reported at 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (K.B.
1708).
68. See MACMILLAN, supra note 49, at 2.
69. Obscene libel, not to be confused with written defamation, is the "common-law
crime of publishing, with the intent to corrupt, material ... that tends to deprave or corrupt
those whose minds are open to immoral influences." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (7th ed.
1999). The offense particularly concerned "sexual words or pictures." Id.
70. Read, 92 Eng. Rep. at 777.
71. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 21-22.
72. SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 5.
73. The Queen v. Read, 88 Eng. Rep. 953, 953 (K.B. 1708).
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cifically rejected the government's contention that the crime of libel could
include the publication of racy literature:
This is for printing bawdy stuff, but reflects on no person, and a libel
must be against some particular person or persons, or against the Gov-
ernment. It is stuff not fit to be mentioned [publicly]; if there should be
no remedy in the Spiritual Court, it does not follow there must be a rem-
edy here. There is no law to punish it, I wish there were, but we cannot
make law; it indeed tends to the corruption of good manners, but that is
not sufficient for us to punish.
74
Powell refused to extend Sedley as a precedent, noting that Sedley's explicit
acts of obscenity (particularly eliminating upon onlookers) and provocation
of a crowd provided that court with something more than mere nudity upon
a balcony.7' Therefore, at least for the time following the court's decision in
Read, the English courts refused to extend the crime of obscenity to pub-
lished materials.76
c. Curl: Sedley used as precedent in the first successful prosecu-
tion for obscene libel
In The King v. Curl,77 Edmund Curll,78 a rather notorious early eight-
eenth-century bookseller, 79 faced an indictment for publishing Venus in the
Cloister, or The Nun in Her Smock, a book consisting mostly of lewd mate-
rial. 80 The government originally indicted CurlI in 1725, but the court di-
vided sharply over the issue of whether publishing bawdy material was a
crime.8' Sir John Fortescue opined that Curll's was "a great offence," but
stated that he knew of no law offering punishment for such an offense. 2 For
Fortescue, the Read decision created sound precedent that publishing racy
74. Read, 92 Eng. Rep. at 777.
75. Id.
76. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 5.
77. 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727).
78. Though the court referred to the defendant as "Edmond Curl," the modem practice
is to refer to him as "Edmund Curll." See, e.g., MAYNARD MACK, ALEXANDER POPE: A LIFE
296 (1985).
79. ALEXANDER POPE, Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, in POETRY AND PROSE OF ALEXANDER
POPE 200 n.53 (Aubrey Williams ed., Houghton Miffin 1969) (1735). Curll, according to
Williams, was "an industrious but shameless and unscrupulous bookseller and publisher; he
specialized in disreputable literature of all kinds, and frequently gave unauthorized publica-
tion to personal and private papers and correspondence." Id. CurlI pirated some of Pope's
work, leading to a bitter feud between the two men that culminated in Pope's extended, vi-
cious mock-epic lampoon of Curll in Book 1I of The Dunciad. Id. at 323-25, lines 31-120.
80. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. at 849.
81. See Reynolds, supra note 54, at 221.
82. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. at 850.
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material, without some breach of the peace or act of force (as with Charles
Sedley), did not rise to the level of a crime against the crown.83 Similarly,
Judge Probyn had doubts about the case, and the court ordered further ar-
gument for a later date.84
Curll might have escaped punishment had he been a more cautious
man, but he managed instead to irritate King George II, who already dis-
liked Fortescue.85 George II removed Fortescue from the bench, replacing
him with Francis Page, infamous as a "hanging judge." 86 Page's arrival on
the court precipitated a change in the court's attitude toward Curll's case,
and the court unanimously convicted Curll of the offense. 87 The court rea-
soned that Curli had committed "a temporal offence, 8 8 which fell under the
court's jurisdiction as the guardian of English morality.89 In so holding, the
court rejected the Read court's reasoning that Sedley turned largely upon the
use of force, instead interpreting the case to stand in large part as an exam-
ple of the court's role as protector of public morality. 90 The court further
stated that "if Read's case was to be adjudged [by this court], they should
rule it otherwise." 91 Curll received as punishment a stint in the pillory, a
punishment lauded by the reporter of the decision as "well deserved.,
92
Curll thus became the first person in England convicted for publishing
erotic material, and the judges created a new law of obscenity.93
83. See id. at 851. Fortescue also served as the reporter for one printing of the Read
decision. The Queen v. Read, 92 Eng. Rep. 777, 777 (K.B. 1708). In that report of the case,
Fortescue attached a note informing readers of his involvement in the Curl decision: "the
Court gave judgment against the Defendant, but contrary to my opinion; and I quoted this
case [Read]." Id.
84. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. at 851.
85. Reynolds, supra note 54, at 221.
86. Id.
87. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. at 851.
88. The phrase "temporal offense," distinguished from spiritual or ecclesiastical of-
fenses, means something like the modem use of the word "secular." See, e.g., AUGUSTINE,
Law and Self-Defense, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 213, 215-16 (Michael W. Tkacz & Douglas
Kries trans., Ernest L. Fortin & Douglas Kries eds., 1994) (temporal law is "the law that
restrains peoples in this life" and "can nevertheless justly be changed in the course of time")
(no date of original publication); MARTIN LUTHER, An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German
Nationality as to the Amelioration of the State of Christendom, in MARTIN LUTHER:
SELECTIONS FROM His WRITINGS 403, 473 (John Dillenberger ed., 1962) (1520) (comparing
temporal law to spiritual law).




93. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 23.
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2. The Victorian Period. Legislative and Judicial Regulation of Ob-
scenity
Though the Curl judges established the new crime of obscene libel,
history shows few prosecutions under the law in the years immediately fol-
lowing the decision.94 The availability of obscene libel, it seems, did little to
stem the rising tide of production and consumption of erotically charged
materials; indeed, the proscription of graphic materials seems to have
gained momentum more through societal pressures than judicial fiat.95 As
political power fell into the hands of the rising middle class, a war of sorts
began against impropriety. 96 Anti-vice societies arose and took it upon
themselves to suppress, amongst other immoral activities, sexually explicit
materials. 97 Attempts to regulate sexually explicit materials during the pe-
riod center upon legislation, but the most important development in obscen-
ity law derives from the case of The Queen v. Hicklin,98 in which the court
offered the first judicial attempt at defining obscenity. 99 This subsection
briefly discusses Victorian legislation against obscenity and culminates with
an examination of Hicklin's definition of obscenity.
a. Scattered early attempts at legislation against obscenity
Though the common law offense of obscene libel provided the Society
for the Suppression of Vice ("Society") an avenue to pursue some of their
unsavory foes, the Society possessed too much zeal to be content with hav-
ing only a common-law weapon.100 In 1824 the Society's efforts helped to
produce the Vagrancy Act, a law that provided imprisonment for publica-
tion, public display, or public sale of any indecent picture.1l° Fearing an
influx of obscene continental materials, 0 2 Parliament enacted a statute that
prohibited the importation of obscene materials, a law apparently brought
into existence as a reaction against racy French postcards that had flooded
94. Id. at 23-24. The most notable use of obscene libel came in 1763, when political
troublemaker John Wilkes published a bawdy parody of Alexander Pope's poetry entitled
Essay on Woman and faced prosecution for his offense. Id.
95. Id. at 26.
96. MACMILLAN, supra note 49, at 4.
97. See id. In the period between 1802 and 1857, the Society for the Suppression of
Vice instituted 159 prosecutions for obscene libel, only five of which failed to secure a con-
viction. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 26.
98. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (Q.B. 1868).
99. Id.




England at the time.' 03 These enactments, however, were insignificant com-
pared to what soon followed.
b. The Obscene Publications Act (Lord Campbell's Act)-1857
Though hundreds of peddlers of obscenity suffered prosecutions
throughout the nineteenth century at the behest of the Society, 10 4 its efforts
did little to stop the production or consumption of pornography. 10 5 The
cause of suppressing erotic materials found a new ally in Lord Campbell,
who was Lord Chief Justice, in 1857.106 The Obscene Publications Act, usu-
ally known as Lord Campbell's Act, 10 7 was a civil act concerned with pro-
viding a means of destroying obscene literature. Magistrates could issue
search warrants empowering the police to search premises suspected of
housing obscene material, which, if found, the magistrates could order de-
stroyed. 10 8 In practice the procedure worked somewhat like the following: a
magistrate, shown a suspicious book, issued a search warrant; the prosecu-
tor, authorized by warrant, raided the suspect premises and seized any books
that raised further suspicion; the prosecutor then delivered the seized books
to the magistrate, who ordered them destroyed if his examination of the
contents found the materials to be sufficiently obscene. 0 9 As the magistrate
who issued the search warrant tended to be the same magistrate who de-
cided to destroy obscene materials, a search warrant usually resulted in the
destruction of the materials the prosecutor seized. " 0
The support of the Society aside, strong opposition arose in Parliament
to the Act, and a fairly sharp debate took place."' Concerning itself with
providing a procedure for finding and destroying obscene materials, the bill
neglected to provide a definition of obscenity, and the omission troubled
many members of Parliament." 12 The opposition seized upon three issues to
express its displeasure with the proposed act: (1) the possible use of the Act
to proscribe literary works; (2) the possible interference on the part of those
empowered by the Act to harass legitimate works; and (3) the absence of
any definition of obscenity.' 13 Lords Lyndhurst and Brougham stated their
103. Id.; SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 7.
104. See supra note 97.
105. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 28. As an example of the Society's lack of success,
twenty bookshops specializing in erotic materials operated on Holywell Street in 1857. Id.
106. See MACMILLAN, supra note 49, at 5.
107. Id.
108. SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 6-7.
109. ROBERTSON, supra note 45, at 28.
110. Id.
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belief in the adequacy of the existing laws against obscenity, fearing that the
broader powers of the new law might have a deleterious effect on the pro-
duction and enjoyment of classic texts like Ovid.'" 4 Members of Parliament
feared that the government was trying to police morality and that the law
was pointless because people who sought the materials would get them de-
spite the government's efforts." 
5
Lord Campbell defended his act against its detractors, telling the
House that he did not intend the new law to apply to works of art or litera-
ture; rather, its purpose was to prevent the spread of such materials that
served only to corrupt youth and general decency. 1 6 Further, Campbell con-
tended, the law would prohibit only work created with the intention of cor-
rupting. 117 Lord Lyndhurst, one of the Act's opponents, reminded Campbell
"that an act of Parliament does not mean what its sponsors intend it to mean,
but what later generations of judges want it to mean," but Campbell and his
followers did not heed the warning." 8 The Act passed, and the fallacy of
Campbell's defense was exposed as the application of the law showed that
intent, whether to corrupt or just to be erotic, bore little or no consideration
in cases involving the Obscene Publication Act." 9 As Lyndhurst warned,
judges would soon decide what constituted obscenity under the law.
c. Hicklin: The first judicial definition of obscenity
In The Queen v. Hicklin,120 the Queen's Bench fulfilled the warning to
Campbell that future judges would define obscenity independently of par-
liamentary intent.' 21 Henry Scott, a metal broker in the town of Wolver-
hampton, was a member of The Protestant Electoral Union, a group that
sought "to protest against those teachings and practices which are un-
English, immoral, and blasphemous, to maintain the Protestantism of the
Bible and the liberty of England," and to support members of Parliament
who would "expose and defeat the deep-laid machinations of the Jesuits,
and resist grants of money for Romish purposes."'' 22 Exposing Catholic
machinations included-for Scott at least-purchasing and distributing at
cost copies of a pamphlet entitled "The Confessional Unmasked; shewing
the depravity of the Romish priesthood, the iniquity of the Confessional,





119. MACMILLAN, supra note 49, at 5.
120. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
122. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 362 (internal citations omitted).
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and the questions put to females in confession" to anyone who desired to
have a copy.1 23 The Queen's Bench Court, in its recitation of the case's
facts, found about half of the pamphlet to be "obscene in fact as relating to
impure and filthy acts, words, and ideas."
'124
Under the authority of Lord Campbell's Act, Wolverhampton magis-
trates issued a warrant, and police officers seized 252 copies of the pam-
phlet. 125 The magistrates ordered the pamphlets destroyed, but Scott ap-
pealed to the Wolverhampton Quarter Sessions, where the recorder, Benja-
min Hicklin, found that the sale and distribution of the pamphlets was not a
misdemeanor and quashed the order for the destruction of the pamphlets.
26
Hicklin reasoned that although the pamphlets were indeed obscene in part,
Scott's intention in distributing them was not to do harm. 1
27
The Court of the Queen's Bench reviewed Hicklin's decision, discuss-
ing intent and motive at some length before arriving at the decision that a
work's intent is of no concern if the work is obscene. 128 Therefore, because
Hicklin had already deemed Scott's anti-Catholic pamphlets obscene, the
pamphlet was punishable, and the magistrates' decision to order the destruc-
tion of such obscenity was lawful; the Queen's Bench Court thus reversed
the recorder's decision.1
29
The case's most important component, however, came in dicta. Lord
Chief Justice Cockburn, after disposing of the case, proceeded to give a
definition of obscenity: "I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall., 130 Additionally, the work need not be ob-
scene taken as a whole; a passage found obscene sufficed for declaring the
book obscene.' 31 Cockburn's test, then, based its definition of obscenity on
the effect of the work upon individuals particularly susceptible to corrup-
tion, disregarding the work's effect, or lack thereof, on the public at large.'
32
123. Id. Scott distributed between two and three thousand copies of the pamphlet for one
shilling each. Id.
124. Id. at 363.
125. See id at 362.
126. Id. at 360, 362-63; see also SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 7.
127. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 364.
128. See id at 363-69.
129. Id. at 370, 373.
130. Id. at 368, 371.
131. Id.
132. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 7-8.
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B. Obscenity in the American Courts: The Constitutionalization of
Obscenity Law
The history of American regulation of obscenity tended, from the
founding to the middle of the twentieth century, to follow English prece-
dent. 133 Some states actively enforced the common-law crime of obscene
libel;134 some states passed statutes prohibiting obscene materials;' 35 and the
federal government banned the mailing of obscene materials.' 36 Conspicu-
ously absent from the regulation of obscenity in the United States was a
definition of obscenity, and lacking a definition rooted in American law or
based upon the Constitution, many courts simply adopted the Hicklin test.
37
Judge Learned Hand, in applying the Hicklin definition in United States v.
Kennerley,138 criticized the test as unduly harsh, noting that "however con-
sonant [Hicklin] may be with mid-Victorian morals, [it] does not seem to
me to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time."'
39
After this long period of unsure standards for obscenity, by the 1950s,
courts did not apply obscenity law uniformly, and books held obscene in
one part of the United States might not be held obscene elsewhere.
40
Accordingly, "the definition of obscenity was long ripe for adjudication by
the United States Supreme Court."' 4' In addition to formulating a uniform
definition of obscenity, the Supreme Court also faced the issue of obscenity
against the background of the First Amendment's protection of speech and
133. DANIEL S. MORETTI, OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE LAW UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 1 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 100 (Pa. 1815) (holding
that obscene libel was a crime at common law and was thus a crime in Pennsylvania).
135. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 8-11 (discussing early state laws banning obscen-
ity).
136. Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and
Articles of Immoral Use, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(2000)).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760, 761-62 (N.D. Cal.
1951), aff'd sub nom. Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953) (applying Hicklin
definition to hold Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn obscene); United
States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1103-04 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571) (upholding
trial court's use of Hicklin standard for jury instructions on the issue of whether passages of
materials were obscene).
138. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
139. 1d. at 120. Judge Hand begrudgingly applied Hicklin because the "test has been
accepted by the lower federal courts until it would be no longer proper for me to disregard
it." Id. For a decision in which the court explicitly rejected the Hicklin test and formulated a
new test, see United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (holding that James Joyce's Ulysses was not obscene
because, taken as a whole, the novel was not an " aphrodisiac").
140. MORETTI, supra note 133, at 4.
141. Id.
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press. 42 This subsection traces the development of the United States Su-
preme Court's constitutionalization of obscenity law, beginning with the
Court's first definition of obscenity in Roth v. United States,143 moving to
the Court's refining of that definition in a handful of 1960s cases, and fi-
nally considering the Court's retrenchment on the definition of obscenity in
Miller v. California. 144
1. Roth: The Supreme Court Decides the Issue of Obscenity Under
the First Amendment and Defines Obscenity
While the issue of obscenity as a protected form of speech under the
First Amendment arose during the 1940s and remained current throughout
the 1950s, 145 the Supreme Court did not deal with the issue until Roth v.
United States. 146 In that case, Roth sought certiorari on a conviction in a
New York federal court for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1461, the federal obscen-
ity statute that declared obscene material "nonmailable matter."' 147 The
Court also heard and decided, along with Roth's case, the case of Alberts,
whom California had convicted of violating the obscenity provisions of the
California Penal Code for selling and composing obscene materials.1
48
a. Obscenity and the First Amendment
The Court considered the same issue for both Roth and Alberts:
"whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and
press" under the First Amendment. 49 To answer this question, Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, examined the history of obscenity. 50 The
Court noted that, though it had not decided the issue, it had always assumed
that the First Amendment did not protect obscenity, an assumption sup-
ported by the lack of state protection of obscenity prior to the adoption of
the First Amendment. 52 The Court stated that "[i]n light of this history, it is
142. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 29-30.
143. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
144. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
145. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 30-33. Schauer notes that the same period saw the
prosecutions of many respected literary texts, rather than commercial pornography, as ob-
scenity, perhaps affecting the Supreme Court's decision in Roth. Id. at 33.
146. 354 U.S. at 476.
147. Id. at 479 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1461).
148. Id. at 481.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 479, 482-83.
151. Id. at 483.
152. Roth, 354 U.S. at 482. The opinion notes that of the fourteen states that had ratified
the Constitution by 1792, ten states had guaranties of freedom of expression, and none of
those ten states protected obscenity under those guaranties. See id.
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apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not
intended to protect every utterance."' 53 While the First Amendment affords
its protections to "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social im-
portance," the Court rejected obscenity "as utterly without redeeming social
importance," holding that obscenity does not fall under the aegis of consti-
tutionally protected speech or press.1
5 4
b. The Roth definition of obscenity
After deciding that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity,
the Court defined obscenity. The Court began its analysis of the definitional
issue by explicitly rejecting the Hicklin definition of obscenity: "The Hick-
lin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most
susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating
with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the
freedoms of speech and press."'155 Obscene material, in the Court's defini-
tion, "is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest''s6 or "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."'' 57 The
Court emphasized that this definition did not apply to a work simply be-
cause sex is a theme or object of representation in the work.
1 58
Having thus defined obscenity, the Roth court provided a test for de-
termining whether materials fall under that definition. First, a court must
consider "whether to the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest."' 59 The second part of the Roth test inquires whether
material alleged to be obscene is "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance." 160 Therefore, under the Roth test, a work that appeals to the prurient
interest might not be obscene if a court could determine that the work has
some small measure of redeeming social importance.
161
2. Later Modifications of the Roth Test
While Roth answered some questions regarding obscenity-namely
whether the First Amendment protects obscenity and whether the Hicklin
153. Id. at 483.
154. Id. at 485.
155. Id. at 489.
156. Id. at 487.
157. Id. at487n.20.
158. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
159. Id. at 489.
160. Id. at 484.
161. Id.
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test satisfied the Constitution-the decision left open some questions re-
garding the definition of obscenity.' 62 In the early and mid-1960s, the Court
modified the Roth test several times; the most important of these modifica-
tions came in Manual Enterprises v. Day,16 3 Jacobellis v. Ohio,164 and A
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massa-
chusetts. 
161
a. Manual Enterprises v. Day: Obscene material must be pat-
ently offensive, and protected material need not have redeem-
ing value
Manual Enterprises represents the Court's first important adjustment
of the Roth definition. 66 In Manual Enterprises, the Postmaster General
found magazines distributed by Manual Enterprises that featured pictures of
naked male models to be obscene; thus, the Postmaster General prohibited
the company from mailing its magazines. 167 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a district court decision
that the materials were obscene. 68 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the status of the publications.
1 69
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision.170 Justice Harlan
announced the divided Court's decision, 17 1 issuing an opinion stating that
the prurient interest component of the Roth test was insufficient alone to
determine obscenity; thus Harlan appended to the test a requirement that the
work be patently offensive as well. 172 Harlan also noted that while the
magazines in question possessed no scientific or artistic merit, they were not
obscene, thus limiting the Roth test's redeeming value component. 73 There-
fore, Harlan's opinion in Manual Enterprises limits both components of the
Roth test, edging the Court toward an obscenity definition that encompassed
"hard-core" pornography only.1
74
162. See MORETrI, supra note 133, at 11.
163. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
164. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
165. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
166. MORETTI, supra note 133, at 13.
167. Manual Enters., 370 U.S. at 479-80.
168. Manual Enters. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 478
(1962).
169. Manual Enters., 370 U.S. at 479-80.
170. Id. at 495.
171. Id. at 479. Justice Stewart joined in Justice Harlan's opinion. Id.
172. Id. at 486.
173. Id. at 481-82.
174, MORETTI, supra note 133, at 15.
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b. Jacobellis: Community standards are national standards
Just as Roth did not finally answer the problem of establishing a defini-
tion of obscenity, Manual Enterprises failed to provide any lasting solution
to the problem, particularly the terms "patently offensive" and "prurient
interest" lacked clear definition. 7 5 Further, the socially redeeming value
component still presented some difficulty to courts considering the obscen-
ity question. 1
76
In this climate, the Court decided Jacobellis v. Ohio,'77 a case in which
the Court again restricted the scope of the government's authority to pro-
scribe obscenity.17 8 An Ohio state court convicted Jacobellis, a theatre man-
ager, for the exhibition of obscene films. 7 9 The Supreme Court took the
appeal to decide whether the film Jacobellis showed was indeed obscene. 80
Justice Brennan, writing an opinion in which Justice Goldberg joined, an-
nounced the judgment of the Court that the movie was not obscene, revers-
ing the Ohio Supreme Court.18' Brennan's opinion stated that the govern-
ment may prohibit obscenity because obscene materials are utterly without
redeeming social value, noting that the mere portrayal of sex in artistic and
scientific endeavors was not cause for proscribing those materials. 8 2 The
correct test also did not attempt to weigh the prurient interest against a
work's redeeming social value, "for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is
'utterly' without social importance."' 8 3 The Court in Jacobellis also adopted
the patent-offensiveness test announced by Justice Harlan in Manual Enter-
prises. 184
Perhaps the most important restatement of a Roth principle in Jacobel-
lis, though, lies in Justice Brennan's further definition of the community
whose standards should adhere under Roth's "contemporary community
standards" component. 185 In the period between the Roth and Jacobellis
decisions, some commentators had suggested that the contemporary com-
munity standards test implied that the applicable standards for determining
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
178. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 42.
179. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 185-86. Jacobellis's conviction was affirmed by an interme-
diate Ohio appellate court. Ohio v. Jacobellis, 175 N.E.2d 123, 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
The Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently affirmed the Ohio Court of Appeals decision. Ohio
v. Jacobellis, 179 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ohio 1962).
180. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 186-87.
181. Id. at 185, 187.
182. Id. at 191.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 191-92.
185. Id. at 193.
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the constitutional issue of obscenity in each case were the standards of the
particular community from which the case arose.' 86 Brennan rejected this
explanation of the standard, stating that a local definition of community
standards defied implementation.1 87 Brennan based the rejection of local
standards, as determining in the consideration of obscenity, on the principle
that the "Court has explicitly refused to tolerate a result whereby 'the con-
stitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with state
lines."-,1 88 Therefore, the standards that courts should use to determine ob-
scenity were national, rather than local.
189
c. Memoirs: A restatement of Roth with a three-element test
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,90 the Supreme Court again faced the is-
sue of what constitutes obscenity. This time John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure (also known as Fanny Hill)191 was the target of gov-
ernment regulation; a Massachusetts court had declared the book obscene in
an in rem proceeding' 92 brought against the book itself.193 The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment that the book was obscene. 1
94
The Court used Memoirs as an opportunity to provide a definitive re-
statement of the Roth test and its subsequent modifications. Justice Brennan,
in an opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas joined,
195
restated the Roth test:
Under [the Roth] definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three
elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contempo-
rary community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social
value. 
19 6
186. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 192.
187. Id. at 193.
188. Id. at 194-95 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
189. Id. at 195.
190. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
191. For a brief treatment of the history and importance of this seminal work of English
pornography, along with an account of John Cleland's life, see PETER SABOR, Introduction to
JOHN CLELAND, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE vii-xxvi (Peter Sabor ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1999) (1748-1749).
192. Attorney General v. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure," 206 N.E.2d 403, 404 (Mass. 1965).
193. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 415.
194. Id. at 417.
195. Id. at 414.
196. Id. at 418.
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Each component of the test receives its own consideration; weighing the
factors against one another is improper. 197 This restatement of the Roth test
further established the trend toward a definition of obscenity encompassing
only "hard-core" materials that had been growing since the Court decided
Roth. 98
3. Miller: The Court Reconsiders and Reshapes the Roth Test
The very limited scope for government regulation in the wake of
Memoirs led to very few successful prosecutions for obscenity offenses, and
the period was one of minimal regulation of sexually explicit materials.
199
The substantive law regarding obscenity did not change again until 1973,
when the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California.200 Miller mass-
mailed unsolicited advertising brochures that were sexually explicit to con-
sumers, and a California court convicted him of violating California's ob-
scenity law.20' The Supreme Court, in vacating and remanding Miller's
conviction, reaffirmed the Roth standard for obscenity, but reconstituted the
test into a three-part consideration, the elements of which are considered in
the following subsections.
202
a. Contemporary standards and the prurient interest
The first element of the Court's three-part test in Miller is a re-
statement of the Roth test for obscenity: "whether 'the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards,' would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." 203 This element reasserts the
notion that the standards employed in making an obscenity determination
are not to be the national standards set out in Jacobellis; rather, the opera-
tive standards are to be local standards in the community in which the court
making the determination sits.
204
b. Patent offensiveness
The second element of the Miller test is "whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
197. Id. at 419-20.
198. SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 43.
199. See id. at 43-44.
200. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
201. Id. at 16.
202. See id. at 24.
203. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
204. Id. at 30-32.
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by the applicable state law. 2 °5 This element retains the patent offensiveness
standard that the Court had added to Roth in the Manual Enterprises and
Jacobellis decisions, but the element also added "a due process standard"
requiring that statutes prohibiting obscenity specifically state the sorts of
depictions that the law covered.20 6 The need for careful limitation of state
regulatory powers over any type of expression resulted in the Court confin-
ing "the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or de-
scribe sexual conduct., 20 7 The Court further defined constitutionally al-
lowed regulation as being directed toward "'hard core' sexual conduct spe-
cifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed., 20 8
c. Serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
The third Miller element is "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value., 20 9 This element repre-
sents the most significant departure from the earlier Court interpretations of
Roth: the Court specifically rejected the constitutional standard, announced
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, that a work be utterly without redeeming so-
cial value for regulation to be permissible. 210 Therefore, the Court's new test
offered a standard under which "[a]t a minimum, prurient, patently offen-
sive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have ...value" in
some important sphere of endeavor. 21 As an example of a text that might
appeal to the prurient interest and be patently offensive but not qualify as
obscenity under the test, the Court offered medical textbooks that contain
graphic photographs or other illustrations and textual descriptions of human
anatomy, noting that the scientific value of these texts prevents their prohi-
bition.2t2 Unlike the previous test announced in Memoirs, Miller requires a
work to have some value in some field of study or endeavor.1 3
C. Ferber and Osborne: The Child Pornography Problem Under Miller
While the Miller decision provided a test for obscenity that still stands
nearly thirty years later, the question of child pornography under the Miller
test remained unanswered in the decade following the Supreme Court's
205. Id. at 24.
206. SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 46-47.
207. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
208. Id. at 27.
209. id. at 24.
210. Id. at 24-25 (quoting A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)).
211. Id. at 26.
212. Id.
213. Miller, 413 U.S. at 26.
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redefinition of obscenity.214 By the mid-1970s, child pornography had
grown into a large industry, producing by one count some 260 different
magazines depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.2"5 In
response to the rising flow of child pornography, the federal government
and several state governments enacted statutes against child pornography,
many of which did not require that the material in question be obscene un-
der the Miller standard.216
In light of the Supreme Court's rulings that material necessarily must
be obscene before government regulation is constitutional, these statutes
posed a problem under the First Amendment.217 This section details the
Court's decisions in New York v. Ferber218 and Osborne v. Ohio,219 the
cases creating an exception to the rule that material must be obscene if the
government is to regulate it and granting the states the power to prohibit the
production, distribution, and possession of child pornography.
1. Ferber: Child Pornography's Intrinsic Relation to the Sexual
Abuse of Children
Paul Ferber, owner of a Manhattan bookstore specializing in erotic ma-
terials, sold two films featuring child pornography to an undercover police
officer.220 Ferber's sale of the films brought prosecution for violating New
York's child pornography statute, which prohibited the knowing promotion
by distribution of materials depicting sexual performances by children under
the age of sixteen, regardless of whether the material was obscene. 221 A trial
court convicted Ferber, and the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court affirmed the conviction without opinion.222 The New York
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the conviction, reasoning that the New
York statute violated the First Amendment by prohibiting materials that
were not necessarily obscene.223 New York sought review from the United
States Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the First Amendment allowed a state to prohibit child pornography regard-
less of whether the prohibited material was obscene.224




218. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
219. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
220. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751-52.
221. Id. at 750-51.
222. People v. Ferber, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
223. People v. Ferber, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. 1981).
224. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
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The Supreme Court held that where material depicts child sexual
abuse, states have an interest in prohibiting child pornography regardless of
the material's content.225 The Court noted, in response to Ferber's argument
that Miller's obscenity test provided enough regulatory power for the state
to stop child sexual abuse, that "a work which, taken on the whole, contains
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless em-
body the hardest core of child pornography., 226 The Ferber Court further
stated that states may prohibit the distribution of child pornography because
of the intrinsic relationship between the distribution of such materials and
the sexual abuse of children; circulation of such materials would cause fur-
ther harm to the child by creating a permanent record of the abuse, and con-
trolling the production of pornography entails closing the market for such
materials. 227 Based on this rationale of protecting children from sexual
abuse at the hands of child pornographers, the Court thus allowed states to
take far more aggressive steps against the distribution of child pornography
than those measures previously allowed against purveyors of other graphic
materials.
2. Osborne: States May Prohibit Possession of Child Pornography
The Supreme Court extended its Ferber holding in Osborne to allow
states to prohibit the possession of child pornography.228 The Court based its
extension of Ferber on a concern for the state's interest in protecting child
pornography's victims, an interest that justifies attempts to stop child por-
nography at every point in its distribution chain. 229 Along with this concern
for the children who are victims of such pornography, the Court reiterated
the Ferber concern for stopping the harm caused by the free circulation of
the record of a child's abuse.230 Additionally, the Court noted that pedo-
philes might use child pornography to seduce new victims giving states an-
other reason to ban possession of such materials.23'
The varied history of obscenity law leads, then, to the constitutional
standards that now control government attempts at regulating sexually ex-
plicit materials. Under Miller, sexually explicit materials receive protection
from the First Amendment so long as they are not obscene under the test
announced in that case.232 Ferber (along with Osborne) creates an exception
225. Id. at 761 n.12.
226. Id. at 761.
227. Id. at 759.
228. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
229. Id. at 110.
230. Id. at 111.
231. Id.
232. See supra Part III.B.3.
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to the Miller test, removing materials displaying the sexual abuse of chil-
dren from the First Amendment's protection.233 Against this scheme of First
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court decided Ashcroft.
IV. REASONING
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,234 the United States Supreme
Court held overbroad provisions of the CPPA235 that prohibited graphic
images appearing to be of children or conveying the impression that they
depicted children because the law banned speech protected by the First
Amendment. 236 After a brief discussion of the types of images banned under
the CPPA and Congress's reasons for banning those images, 237 the majority
opinion of the Court proceeded to examine the two provisions of the CPPA
in question and declare them overbroad.238
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority's judgment, adding that the
government's argument that purveyors of actual child pornography might
argue that their images are computer-generated is too speculative at this
239point to justify the CPPA's broad restrictions on such images. Justice
O'Connor concurred in the majority's opinion as to its judgment that a pro-
hibition on "youthful-adult pornography" and material conveying the im-
pression that actual children appear in the images infringed upon protected
speech, but she dissented from the majority's decision that the CPPA's ban
of virtual child pornography was overbroad.24 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a
dissent joined by Justice Scalia,241 argued that the CPPA's legitimate sweep
was substantial enough to offset any negative effects of broad readings of
the Act's reach and potential effects on First Amendment rights.
242
233. See supra Part IlI.C.
234. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000).
236. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
237. Id. at 241-42.
238. Id. at 243-58. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court affirming the
Ninth Circuit's judgment. Id. at 258.
239. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's dissent only. Id. at 260 (O'Connor, J., concurring
and dissenting).
241. Id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined the Chief Justice's
dissent except for one paragraph discussing the CPPA's legislative record. Id. at 270-71 n.2
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
242. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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A. The Majority Opinion
1. The "Appears To Depict" Provision
The Court began its analysis of the CPPA by examining the Act's lan-
guage, particularly the sections of the Act under challenge before the
Court.2 4 3 The Court noted that, before the CPPA's enactment in 1996,
"Congress defined child pornography as... images made using actual mi-
nors," a prohibition retained under the CPPA.244 The CPPA added "three
other prohibited categories of speech, of which the first, § 2256(8)(B), and
the third, § 2256(8)(D), are at issue in this case."
245
In considering 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), the Court first examined the
statute under the Miller test for obscenity. 246 The Court found that the CPPA
extended "to images that appear to depict a minor engaging in sexually ex-
plicit activity without regard to the Miller requirements." 247 Under the
CPPA's statutory language, prohibited materials did not have to appeal to
the prurient interest, and the statute proscribed any depiction of graphic
sexual activities, regardless of their presentation.248 As a result of that lan-
guage, the Act's proscription extended to "a picture in a psychology man-
ual" and to movies "depicting the horrors of sexual abuse., 24 9 Moreover, the
Act did not require materials to be patently offensive and failed to take into
account that not every explicit depiction of underage sexual activity contra-
venes community standards.25°
Delving further into the CPPA's prohibition of non-obscene materials,
the Court considered the literary, artistic, political, and scientific value that
prohibited works might have.251 The language of the Act worked to pro-
scribe "the visual depiction of an idea-that of teenagers engaging in sexual
activity-that is a fact of modem society and has been a theme in art and
243. Id. at 241.
244. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256(8)(A)).
245. Id. The third category, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000), "prohibit[ed] a
more common and lower tech means of creating virtual images, known as computer morph-
ing." Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242. Morphing allows pornographers to "alter innocent pictures of
real children so that the children appear to be engaged in sexual activity." Id. The Court did
not consider the validity of this section because the Free Speech Coalition and its fellow
litigants did not challenge it, but the Court noted in dicta that such images "implicate the
interests of real children," bringing them closer to the images the Court allowed states to
prohibit in Ferber. Id.





251. Id. at 246-47
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literature throughout the ages. 252 The CPPA banned depictions of sexual
activity involving persons that appear under eighteen years of age, an age
higher than the legal age for marriage and for consenting to sexual relations
in many states.253 Further, many literary and other artistic endeavors address
themes covered by the sweep of the CPPA's prohibitions, including any of
numerous adaptations of William Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet and such
Academy Award-winning films as Traffic and American Beauty.254 The
CPPA banned any such work that contained even "a single graphic depic-
tion of sexual activity within the statutory definition," subjecting the posses-
sor of the work to incarceration and fines without inquiring into the work's
redeeming value.255 The CPPA's prohibition of a work because of the pres-
ence of one scene or part violates the First Amendment principle that a
work's artistic merit does not depend upon the presence of one explicit
256scene or segment. For a work to be obscene under the Miller test, its "re-
deeming value [must] be judged by considering the work as a whole."
257
Because the CPPA prohibited works without considering their value as a
whole and also made no link between its prohibitions and community stan-
dards, "the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity" as allowed under
Miller.
258
In seeking to address the failure of the CPPA to sustain scrutiny under
the Miller standards for obscenity, the government argued to the Supreme
Court that the CPPA banned material "virtually indistinguishable from child
pornography, which may be banned without regard to whether it depicts
works of value" under Ferber.259 The Court rejected this contention, how-
ever, explaining that the decisions in Ferber, which allowed states to pro-
hibit the distribution and sale of child pornography, and Osborne, which
allowed states to prohibit the possession of child pornography, premised
approval of such prohibitions on three distinct considerations, the second
and third of which deal with the need to stop the market demand for child
pornography. 260 First, the government has a legitimate interest in protecting
children from the sexual abuse inherent to the production of child pornogra-
phy, regardless of the work's merit.261 Second, child pornography creates "a
252. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246.
253. Id. at 247.
254. Id. at 247-48.
255. Id. at 248.
256. Id. (citing A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion)). For an examination of the
Memoirs case, see supra Part III.B.2.c.
257. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 248.
258. Id. at 249.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 249-50.
261. Id. at 249.
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permanent record of a child's abuse," and "the continued circulation itself
would harm the child who had participated., 262 Third, the traffic in child
pornography provides economic rewards for its production, giving states an
interest in stopping the distribution of such materials.263
In contrast to situations where Ferber permits prohibition of such im-
ages without regard to their other merit, the Court held that the CPPA bans
speech that does not record the crime of child sexual abuse and does not
create victims in its production.26 Virtual child pornography, the Court rea-
soned, has no intrinsic relation to the sexual abuse of children, as did the
actual child pornography at issue in Ferber.265 Any causal link between
virtual child pornography and actual child abuse is "contingent and indirect"
and therefore insufficient to support the CPPA's broad provisions.266
The government argued that even a weak link between virtual child
pornography and any actual harm to children should suffice to support the
ban on such materials because, as acknowledged in Ferber, child pornogra-
phy rarely has value as speech.267 The Court rejected this argument as
flawed in two respects. First, the Court stated that Ferber's concern over
child pornography derived from its production, not the content of the mate-
rials.268 Under Ferber, the First Amendment protects speech that is neither
obscene nor the product of child sexual abuse. 269 Second, the Ferber hold-
ing did not include a declaration that "child pornography is by definition
without value., 270 The Ferber Court actually recognized that some works
might indeed have value and offered "virtual images-the very images pro-
hibited by the CPPA-as an alternative and permissible means of expres-
sion" for certain modes of expression dealing with the sexuality of youth.27'
Indeed, the Court in Ferber "not only referred to the distinction between
actual and virtual child pornography, it relied upon it as a reason supporting
its holding., 272 The Court thus found that the CPPA obliterated the Ferber
distinction and criminalized the alternative means held out by that case as
an acceptable mode for communicating certain ideas, and, accordingly, the
government could find no support for its defense of the Act in that case's
reasoning.273
262. Id.
263. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249-50.




268. Id. at 250-51.
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After the Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller and be-
yond the reach of Ferber, it examined the government's other justifications
for the Act.2 74 The government argued that the CPPA is necessary because
virtual child pornography might prove an aid to pedophiles in seducing
young victims. 275 The Court, noting that the government may punish adults
who provide unsuitable material to children 276 and also may penalize unlaw-
ful solicitation,277 found that the CPPA prohibited speech in an attempt to
protect children from others who might commit crimes.278 Such a law vio-
lates the principle that the government may not prohibit speech acceptable
for adults because children may obtain it.279 While evil may lurk around
such materials, that evil derives from the actor's unlawful conduct, conduct
that is criminal regardless of its link to the speech at issue. 280 Prohibiting
illegal conduct of the sort the government claimed the CPPA targeted does
not justify restricting speech that law-abiding adults may obtain and con-
sume.
281
The government further submitted that virtual child pornography
"whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal
conduct," providing another justification for prohibiting such materials.282
The Court again rejected the government's argument, stating that the "mere
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for
banning it."'283 The government can prohibit speech for its advocacy of the
use of force or of a violation of the law "only if 'such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.' ' 284 In defending the CPPA, the government failed to
prove any "attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy" in the works
prohibited under the CPPA and made only a weak connection between
speech that might encourage certain behaviors and child abuse. 285 For the
government to have made its argument on this point successfully, it would
have needed to demonstrate a more direct and significant connection be-
tween virtual child pornography and child sexual abuse.286 Failing to do so,
the weakly proven tendency of virtual child pornography to whet the appe-
274. Id.
275. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
276. Id. at 251-52 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).




281. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252-53.
282. Id. at 253.
283. Id.




tite of pedophiles does not justify the CPPA's prohibition on virtual child
pornography.287
The government also offered the justification that the valid "objective
of eliminating the market for pornography produced using real children
necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well," arguing that "virtual
images promote the trafficking in works produced through the exploitation
of real children., 288 The Court, finding this hypothesis to border on the im-
plausible, rejected it, reasoning that if virtual images were suitable substi-
tutes for illegal child pornography, the market for the illegal images would
shrivel because the risk of prosecution for abusing real children would carry
little reward if fictional, computerized images provided suitable images for
the market.289
The government's final argument offered in its attempt to provide jus-
tification for the prohibitions of the CPPA on virtual child pornography
centered upon the purported difficulty in prosecuting actual child pornogra-
phy created by virtual child pornography. 290 According to the government,
an expert for the prosecution in the trial of a child pornographer might not
be able to distinguish between actual and virtual child pornographic im-
ages. 29 The only solution, goes the argument, is a prohibition against both
actual and virtual child pornography.292 The Court characterized the argu-
ment as being that "protected speech may be banned as a means to ban un-
protected speech," an argument that "turns the First Amendment upside
down. 293 The resemblance of lawful speech to unlawful speech does not
justify banning the former. The overbreadth doctrine keeps the government
from banning unprotected speech if the prohibition affects a substantial
amount of protected speech.294
Further, the Supreme Court characterized the government as requesting
a reading of the CPPA as a law that distributed the burden of proof to the
defendant to prove that the speech in question is lawful, relying on a statu-
tory affirmative defense that allowed a defendant to escape conviction if he
could show that the materials in question involved only adults in their pro-
duction and that the distribution of the materials did not occur in a manner
conveying the impression that the materials depicted real children.2 95 The
Court rejected the government's position that the affirmative defense should
287. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253-54.





293. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255.
294. Id.
295. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)).
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save the CPPA, basing this rejection on the premise that the defense allowed
conviction for some persons who could prove that the materials did not ex-
ploit children.296 Further, a defendant could only assert the affirmative de-
fense if prosecuted for distributing the images, meaning that a person would
have a defense for distributing a film that another person could face prose-
cution for possessing.297 Finally, the defense was not available to defendants
charged with producing computer-generated images that harmed no children
at all.298 The affirmative defense, then, left "unprotected a substantial
amount of speech not tied to the Government's interest in distinguishing
images produced using real children from virtual ones" and did not save the
CPPA from a First Amendment challenge.
299
2. The "Conveys the Impression" Provision
The respondents also challenged the language in 18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(D) of the CPPA banning "depictions of sexually explicit conduct
that are 'advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.' 300 The Court
found this language to require insufficient examination of the content of the
image in that the CPPA treated films containing no sexually explicit scenes
involving minors as child pornography if the title and trailers simply con-
veyed the impression that one could find the scenes in the film. 30 Thus, this
CPPA provision "turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is de-
picted. 30 2 The "conveys the impression" language made the statute so
broad that any receivers of such materials could suffer prosecution, even
where the receivers shared no responsibility for the marketing, sale, or de-
scription of the images.30 3 The Court held that the First Amendment requires
more precision in such restrictions, and the CPPA, failing to provide such
precision, failed as violating the First Amendment and as being substantially
overbroad.3°
296. Id. at 256.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.
300. Id. at 257 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 258. The Court pointed out that the statute proscribed possession of a movie
advertised as child pornography at any point in the distribution chain, no matter how distant
the advertiser from the possessor, and that the statute also proscribed works that did not




B. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority's judgment. °5 Finding that
the "prosecution rationale" that prosecutors might face difficulty in success-
fully prosecuting child pornographers who claim that the images for which
they are on trial are computer-generated might be valid given some proof of
a successful defense on such grounds, Justice Thomas noted that the gov-
ernment provided no such proof.306 Justice Thomas concluded that the ra-
tionale was too speculative at this point to support the CPPA's broad reach
and thus concurred in the judgment of the Court.
3 07
C. Justice O'Connor's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor concurred in the court's judgment that youthful-adult
and virtual child pornography receive First Amendment protection and that
the CPPA's restrictions on such images were overbroad. °8 Justice
O'Connor concluded that the causal connection between such depictions
and actual child abuse was not strong enough to justify a withdrawal of First
Amendment protection from such speech.30 9 Finally, Justice O'Connor
agreed that the "CPPA's ban on material presented in a manner that 'con-
veys the impression' that it contains pornographic depictions of actual chil-
dren" violated the First Amendment.
310
Justice O'Connor dissented, however, from the Court's holding that
the CPPA's ban of virtual child pornography was overbroad.311 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that courts could read the CPPA to ban pornographic
depictions appearing to be of minors so long as the Act did not apply to
youthful-adult pornography,312 thus reading the act to prohibit only images
depicting virtual children who are virtually indistinguishable from actual
children to assure a narrowly tailored and definite statute.
313
D. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissenting Opinion
Arguing that the majority treated the Ashcroft case differently from
most First Amendment cases, Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Jus-
305. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
306. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)).
309. Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
310. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
312. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tice Scalia, cited the principle that the Court does not normally "strike down
a statute on First Amendment grounds 'when a limiting instruction has been
or could be placed on the challenged statute.' ' 314 The Chief Justice argued
that a narrow reading of the statutory text would have the Act reach only
images consistent with the national goal of enforcing child pornography
laws, a "compelling" goal.315 This narrow reading, at least as performed by
the Chief Justice, interprets the CPPA as prohibiting only "computer-
generated images that are virtually indistinguishable from real children en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct. 3 1 6 Such a prohibition, goes the argu-
ment, does not offend the First Amendment's protection of free speech.317
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The importance of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition318 striking down the ban on virtual child
pornography lies in its affirmation of long-standing principles involving
sexually explicit materials, in its easing of a chilling effect on legitimate
forms of such expression, and in the possibility of further action by propo-
nents of the CPPA to enact new laws in an effort to again prohibit materials
the CPPA once banned. This section addresses each of these issues respec-
tively in an effort to further explain the significance of Ashcroft.
A. The Court's Refusal To Redraw the Lines on Protected Speech
Some of the participants in Ashcroft and observers who favored strik-
ing down the CPPA feared that the Supreme Court might create a new
scheme granting the government broader powers to regulate sexually ex-
plicit material. 319 Ann Beeson, a staff attorney for the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, said that she and her colleagues "were all worried that the Court
would change its mind about Miller v. California and Ferber v. New York,
which are getting to be old precedents., 320 Rather than strike down those
precedents or modify the tests for obscenity and child pornography, the
Court's decision refused, in Beeson's words, "to redraw its line on obscen-
ity.
' 321
314. Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601,613 (1973)).
315. Id. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
316. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
317. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 234.





The Court's refusal to overrule or modify its earlier decisions in this
area indicates that the area of obscenity law will continue its most stable
period since the Court first ruled on obscenity in a First Amendment context
in Roth v. United States.322 In the years that followed Roth, the Court's First
Amendment decisions varied widely, creating a shifting course of law in
which obscenity lacked a clear definition. Since the Miller decision in 1973,
however, the test for obscenity has remained the same, with the Court's
only substantial modification being the allowance for prohibitions against
materials that are not obscene but feature the sexual abuse of actual children
in Ferber. Ashcroft, with its solid six justice majority, indicates that the sta-
bility of obscenity jurisprudence should continue for the foreseeable future.
B. The Court's Protection of Sexually Explicit Speech
In reasserting its previous decisions on obscenity, the Supreme Court
confirmed the constitutional protection of materials that do not fail the
Miller and Ferber tests. A large part of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
focused on the possible chilling effect that enforcement of the CPPA might
have had upon legitimate dramatic and film productions.323 The Court found
that the CPPA criminalized productions like Romeo and Juliet, American
Beauty, and Traffic that have legitimate artistic value simply because they
depict young people engaged in sex acts.324 At oral argument in Ashcroft,
justices asked attorneys for the government to address this concern over the
CPPA's chilling effect, and Deputy Solicitor General Paul D. Clement
325
argued that movie studios could avoid punishment under the CPPA if they
simply excised the sexually explicit conduct the CPPA prohibited in the
movies that the studios make.326
Despite the government's attempt to portray the CPPA's effect on le-
gitimate artistic pursuits as minimal, the experience of director Adrian Lyne
in his production of a film version of Vladimir Nabokov's novel Lolita sug-
gests that the CPPA had a more nefarious effect on filmmakers. 327 Lolita, a
novel dealing with "the affair between a middle-aged sexual pervert and
twelve-year-old girl," has long suffered at the hands of would-be censors,328
322. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's early decisions in this
field and the decisions that led to Miller, see supra Part III.B.
323. See supra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
325. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Ashcrofl v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (No. 00-795).
326. Id.
327. See Charles Taylor, Nymphet Mania, SALON, May 29, 1998, at http://archive.salon.
com/ent/movies/reviews/1998/05/cov29review.html.
328. Charles Rolo, Lolita, by Vladimir Nabokov, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1958, at 78,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/classrev/lolita.htm. Rolo notes that several
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and Lyne's attempt to produce a film version of the novel met with a similar
fate.
329
Lyne took great precautions to avoid making child pornography, em-
ploying an adult actress to stand in during sex scenes for the child actress
playing Lolita.330 During editing of the film, an attorney assisted Lyne with
every scene in an effort to assure that none of the film's scenes crossed the
line into child pornography as defined by the law.331 Despite Lyne's best
efforts to avoid child pornography, every major American movie studio
rejected the film. 332 The reticence of studios to release the film stemmed
from the CPPA.3 33 While it appears that prosecutors sought no charges
against anyone involved in the production of Lolita, the fact remains that the
CPPA kept the. film from receiving a wide audience in the United States.
While "[t]he suppression of Lolita [cannot] be called out-and-out cen-
sorship," the history of Lyne's efforts to release his film provide "a good
example of how easily and insidiously our government can control what we
see without ever openly violating the First Amendment., 334 The Supreme
Court's rejection of the CPPA as unconstitutional explicitly recognizes the
danger that such a law presents to the work of producing and showing art.
Rather than treat potential viewers as "a nation of children incapable of
grasping the subtleties of art,, 335 the Supreme Court has refused to allow the
government to enact a law that threatens legitimate filmmakers with prose-
cution should they produce films dealing with teenage sexuality. So long as
the filmmaker does not actually sexually abuse a child or create an obscene
film, the First Amendment, under the Ashcroft decision, will protect his
efforts.
publishers rejected the novel, and the French government banned it. Id. Rolo also describes
the novel as having "not a single obscene term" and as being a work of "comic genius." Id.
329. See Alissa Havens, Child Pornography Without Children: A 1st Amendment Con-




332. Taylor, supra note 327. The cable network Showtime eventually gave Lolita its
American release. Id.
333. Id.; see also Stephanie Zacharek, Child's Play? The Travails ofAdrian Lyne's "Lo-
lita," BOSTON PHOENIX, June 8, 1998, at http://www.weeklywire.com/ww/06-08-98/boston_
movies_2.html (blaming the inability of Lyne to find a studio on the "cultural watchdogs"
who pushed the CPPA through Congress).
334. Zacharek, supra note 333.
335. Id.
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C. The Possibility for Further Action by Anti-Pornography Crusaders
Ashcroft, though it dealt a damaging blow to anti-child pornography
activists, does not seem to have stopped the drive for laws dealing with the
sorts of images covered under the CPPA.3 36 The Ashcroft decision sparked
considerable outrage amongst conservative commentators, 337 and it seems
quite likely that, depending upon the outcome of congressional elections
and other extrinsic events, Congress will pass and the president will sign
another bill seeking prohibitions along the lines of those contained in the
CPPA. The Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act, a bill passed
this summer by the House of Representatives, seeks to respond to the
Ashcroft decision, but some observers find the bill's provisions to be quite
narrow and perhaps without any real force as written.
338
While the prospects for new legislation targeting virtual child pornog-
raphy and materials suggesting sexual activity involving children remain
somewhat unclear, those who perceive child pornography as a burgeoning
problem will persist in their work against such materials. 339 CPPA propo-
nents like Congressman Mark Foley, who commented that "[p]edophiles do
not have a First Amendment right to gawk over exploited children, real or
virtual, 340 remain determined in their quest, making it quite possible that
Ashcroft may be only the first in a series of legal battles over the sort of
materials at issue in Ashcroft.
Gary D. Marts, Jr.*
336. See Jason Krause, Can Anyone Stop Internet Porn?, 88 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 56,
60 (discussing the passage in the summer of 2002 of The Child Obscenity and Pornography
Prevention Act (COPPA) as a response to Ashcroft). The Senate passed a similar bill in Feb-
ruary 2003. Washington in Brief, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A4. The Senate bill still
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